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A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING
THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM:
ALLOCATING THE TAX BASE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES BASED ON REAL
ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF BENEFIT AND
BURDEN
GLEN RECTENWALD*
“[W]hen there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the
unjust less on the same amount of income.” — Plato1

INTRODUCTION
Globalization has produced a world where capital is highly mobile and
deployed across multiple taxing jurisdictions by single corporate taxpayers.
This mismatch between global capital and national taxing jurisdictions has
proved vexing for national taxing authorities as they attempt to allocate
global corporate income and deductions on a national basis. One of the
most significant manifestations of this allocation problem is the
phenomenon of multi-national enterprises (MNEs) shifting profits to
relatively low-tax jurisdictions through intra-firm transfer pricing, creating
what is called the transfer pricing problem.
To illustrate the problem, consider the hypothetical case of a United
States company that wishes to build a factory in Hong Kong for the
manufacture of flat screen televisions, with the intention of marketing the
televisions in the U.S. Assume a marginal cost of production of $100, a
retail price of $150, and U.S. and Hong Kong corporate income tax rates of
35%2 and 16.5%,3 respectively. In terms of corporate structure, the parent

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2012; Harvard Divinity School, M.T.S. 2009; BaldwinWallace College, B.A. 2007. I would like to thank Katherine Hunter, Catherine Lawson, and
Loni Schutte for their excellent editorial work. This note is dedicated to my wife, Lara, to whom I owe
everything.
1. Plato, THE REPUBLIC, bk. I, at 18, (Paul Negri & Joslyn T. Pine, eds., Benjamin Jowett, trans.,
Dover Publishing rev. ed. 2000) (c. 360 B.C.E.).
2. A simplifying assumption. See 26 U.S.C. § 11.
3. DELOITTE, CORPORATE TAX RATES 2012, available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomGlobal/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/matrices/dttl_cor
porate_tax_rates_2012.pdf.
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company (Parent) has two basic options: build the factory as a foreign
branch within the corporate structure of Parent, or establish the factory
through a wholly owned subsidiary (Sub) incorporated as a Hong Kong
entity. Under the first option, the tax consequences are relatively
straightforward. Since Parent both manufactures and sells the televisions, a
U.S. tax is assessed on the profit derived by Parent from the manufacture
and sale, which will be roughly equivalent to the sale price less the cost of
production, or $50 x 35% = $17.50 corporate tax assessed per unit sold.
The second option introduces an additional step in the chain of
production and sale. Upon manufacture of the televisions, the Parent must
set the transfer price—the intra-firm price the Sub will charge the Parent—
for the televisions. Consider the pricing incentives in light of the
considerable rate differential between the U.S. and Hong Kong. In the
absence of any restrictions on the intra-firm price, the natural incentive will
be to set the transfer price at $150 per television, booking $50 of profit to
the Sub and $0 of profit to Parent. This price minimizes the overall tax
burden to the firm by locating the entire profit of the production and sale
enterprise in Hong Kong, the low-tax jurisdiction. In this hypothetical, a
Hong Kong tax is assessed on the sale to Parent of $50 x 16.5% = $8.25
corporate tax assessed per unit. Parent realizes no gain on the resale of the
televisions in the U.S., and accordingly no U.S. tax is levied.4 From this
example we see that the transfer price effectively functions to allocate
profit between Parent and Sub, with the blended tax rate on the productive
activity equal to the average of the two tax rates weighted by the
percentage of profits allocated to each jurisdiction, respectively.5
The above example illustrates how transfer pricing creates the
incentive for MNEs to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions. Absent some
legal constraint, the transfer pricing problem would erode the corporate tax
base of relatively high-tax jurisdictions. The prevailing legal mechanism
for preventing this erosion, embodied in U.S. law6 and as an international
standard,7 is to adjust the price of the transaction to reflect what the parties
would have bargained for at arms-length. This principle, known as the
arms-length standard (ALS), requires firms to set transfer prices according
4. The tax savings of this arrangement is technically in deferral of US tax. If and when the
profits of Sub are repatriated in the form of a dividend to Parent, the amount of the dividend will be
taxed at ordinary rates, less any applicable foreign tax credit. However, the possibility of a so-called
“repatriation holiday” gives transfer pricing-effected deferrals the potential to become permanent
savings.
5. See, e.g., infra note 9 and accompanying text.
6. See 26 U.S.C. § 482.
7. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD TRANSFER
PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATORS 31-33 (2010).
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to their hypothetical equivalent arms-length price, and empowers taxing
authorities to reset prices, reallocating income and deductions accordingly.
This price setting is principally achieved by looking to comparable
uncontrolled prices and transactions.
Consider how ALS would be used to correct strategic pricing behavior
in the original hypothetical. If the Parent sets the transfer price of the
televisions at $150 in an attempt to realize 100% of the gain in the low tax
jurisdiction, the Parent’s taxing authority can use ALS to restructure the
transaction to reflect what Parent and Sub would have bargained for had
they been independent parties dealing at arms-length. Under U.S. law, §
482 of the Internal Revenue Code empowers the Secretary (through the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)) to make such adjustments, and a complex
array of accompanying regulations describe the standards for making
appropriate adjustments in particular circumstances.8 For a transaction
involving the sale of televisions, a relatively fungible physical good, the
Secretary is likely to apply the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP)
method.9 The IRS might, for instance, look at the market and determine
that for comparable transactions of sufficiently similar televisions between
independent manufacturers and third party distributors, the market price is
$120. Accordingly, the IRS would reallocate $30 of profit per unit sold to
the Parent, and assess $30 x 35% = $10.50 corporate tax per unit.10
The ALS functions to mitigate the effects of the transfer pricing
problem in so far as it is a generally accepted standard that enables taxing
authorities to allocate the taxable income of MNEs, thereby staving off the
erosion of the corporate tax base of high-tax jurisdictions. However, this
paper will argue that the ALS is an inadequate solution on two related
grounds. First, ALS contradicts the economic reality of intra-firm
transactions by effectively treating the relatedness of the parties as
incidental, rather than integral to the transaction. For instance, Parent and
Sub in the above example are a single integrated productive enterprise; the
transfer price charged between them is wholly arbitrary and has no
economic substance. Second, because a hypothetical arms-length transfer
price does not correspond to economic reality, ALS suffers from a lack of
administrability. This lack of administrability is symptomatic of a
dysfunctional regulatory framework with burdensome compliance
requirements, multiple layers of subjective judgment about allocation, and
a lack of correspondence to any reasonable measure of how the global
8. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 et seq.
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3 (as amended in 1995).
10. The new blended tax rate on the productive activity of Parent and Sub given the 60/40 profit
split would be (0.6)(35%) + (0.4)(16.5%) = 27.6%.
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corporate tax base ought to be allocated. In light of this dual failure, this
paper proposes a framework for developing alternative solutions to the
transfer problem, which use real and readily ascertainable economic factors
to allocate the global corporate tax base according to benefits enjoyed and
burdens imposed upon the tax jurisdictions where MNEs transact business.
This paper further proposes that the best method for making allocations
based on benefit/burden analysis is formulary apportionment, and to that
end this paper suggests a novel implementation of formulary apportionment
based on applying different formulas tailored to different categories of
income.
Part I of this paper details the transfer pricing problem in the context
of taxing multinational entities and the prevailing legal mechanism for
setting transfer prices, the arms-length standard. Part II details the
deficiency of ALS as a legal standard that misrepresents the economics of
intra-firm transfers and accordingly fails as a mechanism for allocating the
global corporate tax base. Part III considers alternatives and reforms to
ALS, evaluating existing unilateral and multilateral reform proposals in
terms of their ability to index proportional taxability of MNE income to
burdens and benefits in particular jurisdictions using real, readily
ascertainable economic factors.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM:
DIVIDING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX PIE
Transfer pricing is more than just a technical issue for taxing
authorities. Several features of the contemporary tax landscape combine to
make transfer pricing a high priority for both national taxing authorities and
international organizations such as the OECD. The first condition is the
ever-increasing transnational nature of global economic activity. Though it
may now be an obvious point, the world is interconnected across national
boundaries, due in large part to advances in information technology, such
that physical distance and cultural differences are no longer the barriers to
international trade they once were. This translates to an increasing portion
of the global corporate tax base deriving from international trade. Consider,
for example, the fifty most profitable companies in the U.S. in 2010, which
accounted for 38% of all US corporate profits.11 Fully half of their profits
derived from foreign sources, and in 2010 alone these fifty firms
accumulated $681 billion in undistributed foreign earnings.12 For many

11. Martin A. Sullivan, Foreign Tax Profile of Top 50 U.S. Companies, 132 TAX NOTES 330, 330
(July 25, 2011).
12. Id.
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sources of income, such as the licensing of intellectual property rights to
foreign subsidiaries or the domestic sale of goods produced by foreign
subsidiaries, transfer prices will determine the proportion of profit realized
in the domestic and foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, over sixty percent
of all international trade is carried out within MNEs.13 By implication, the
majority of all cross-border transactional activity is priced internally rather
than by markets at arms-length.
The second significant feature of the contemporary landscape is the
wide differential in corporate tax rates between high-tax jurisdictions and
low-tax jurisdictions.14 As illustrated by the U.S.-Hong Kong example,
large rate differentials create natural and compelling incentives to shift
profits to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing. This incentive,
when combined with the ubiquitous opportunities created by the massive
scale of internally-priced transnational business, produces the “transfer
pricing problem,” where MNEs shift income to minimize taxes, ultimately
to the detriment of revenue collection in higher-tax jurisdictions like the
United States.
A. The First Implementation of ALS: Preserving a New Corporate Tax
Base
The need to address transfer pricing became apparent soon after the
institution of the first income tax in the U.S. and other nations at the start of
the 20th century.15 The U.S. and United Kingdom enacted the first
legislation designed to combat the shifting of profits offshore through
transfer pricing during World War I.16 In the U.S., the War Revenue Act of
1917 empowered the Commissioner to order MNEs to file consolidated
returns to more equitably determine taxable income.17 Subsequent versions
of this statutory authority were drafted as a more general power to
reallocate income and deductions among related entities in a control
group—the conceptual origins of modern § 482.18 By 1935, ALS was
formalized in U.S. tax regulations as the standard to be used when
reallocating income and deductions among controlled groups of taxpayers
13. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Transfer Pricing:
History, State of the Art, Perspectives, 10th mtg at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2001/CRP.6 (June 26,
2001) [hereinafter Transfer Pricing: History, State of the Art, Perspectives].
14. See DELOITTE, supra note 3.
15. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: a Study in the Evolution of
U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) [hereinafter The Rise and Fall of Arm’s
Length].
16. Transfer Pricing: History, State of the Art, Perspectives, supra note 13, at 5.
17. The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length, supra note 15, at 95.
18. Id. at 96.
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to reflect the “true” taxable income of the individual entities.19 The
legislative history of the implementation of this power to reallocate income
using ALS indicates a concern by lawmakers that related corporate entities
could too easily shift profits through questionable internal sales, and that
therefore the government should have the power to “allocate income where
it belongs” and reflect their “true” tax liability.20 There was no discussion
of what standard might govern “true” tax liability.21
When ALS was codified, policy makers did not articulate clear
reasons for why ALS should be the standard employed to protect against
income shifting through transfer pricing. As the early history of ALS in the
U.S. indicates, the standard grew out of a more general sense that tax
authorities needed latitude to adjust the income allocations within MNEs in
order to protect the collection of taxes that were fairly owed to the U.S.
government. This impulse is indicative of the prevailing intellectual and
legislative sentiment in the early years of the corporate income tax, the
justification for which was premised upon the benefits conferred by
government to businesses—namely, the preconditions enabling the
productive activity.22 Thomas Adams, the international tax advisor to the
U.S. Treasury in the 1910s and 1920s,23 described the prevailing
intellectual and legislative rationale for entity-level income taxation:
From political and moral standpoints, the justification for this great class
of taxes is plain. A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the
necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment. . . . Business is
responsible for much of the work which occupies the courts, the police,
the fire department, the army, and the navy. . . . The relationship between
private business and the cost of government is a loose one, much like the
relationship between the expenses of a railroad and the amount of traffic
which it carries. The connection, however, is real and, in the long run,
the more business the greater will be certain fundamental costs of
government. . . . Surveyed from one point of view, business ought to be
taxed because it costs money to maintain a market and those costs should
in some way be distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market.
Looking at the same question from another viewpoint, a market is a

19. Id. at 97.
20. Id. (quoting 69 CONG. REC. 605 (1927) (statement of Rep. William R. Green), cited in J.
SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, 522 (1938)).
21. Id.
22. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International
Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 317 (2005).
23. Id. at 318.
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valuable asset to the social group which maintains it and communities
ought to charge for the use of community assets.24

This benefits-based justification, which conceives of corporate taxes
as covering the shared cost of maintaining public markets, carries the
concomitant need to preserve a corporate tax base commensurate with that
cost. Informed by this reasoning, the ambiguous references to an MNE’s
“true” tax liability suggest that policy makers were expressing at least in
part frustration that purported tax liabilities often did not square with the
benefits enjoyed and burdens imposed by MNEs. Thus their stated
justifications for reallocation provisions using ALS, though technically
imprecise, reflect both a moral and practical concern for the preservation of
the corporate tax base against the eroding forces of the transfer pricing
problem.
What utility early policy makers may have found in using ALS in
particular as the corrective principal will be discussed in Part II. Adjusting
transfer prices using ALS was likely a more reasonable mechanism in the
1920s and 1930s, given the state of MNEs at that time.25 However, policy
makers did not justify ALS in terms of its technical implementation; that
implementation, along with more formal justifications, evolved gradually
over the ensuing decades. Rather, ALS was both adopted and justified to
preserve a corporate tax base intended to generate revenue proportionate to
the costs borne by government in its support of public markets.
B. The Modern Implementation of ALS
To consider how ALS is currently implemented in national tax
regimes, the U.S. transfer pricing rules can serve as a representative
example, because the U.S. standards for determining comparable armslength transactions are substantially similar to the OECD Guidelines and
most modern national taxing regimes.26
The U.S. transfer pricing rules rely on § 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which empowers the taxing authority to allocate income and
deductions among related entities of a control group when “necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any
24. Thomas S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, 11 PROC. ANN. CONF., NAT’L TAX ASS’N 185,
187 (1917).
25. Among other factors, the technology necessary to centrally manage multinational enterprises
was not sufficiently developed. Accordingly, related entities of multinational groups may have operated
with sufficient independents such that transfer pricing was a reasonable method for ensuring the proper
allocation of group income.
26. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006) and accompanying regulations; Income and Corporations
Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 770 (U.K.); OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
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such organizations, trades, or businesses.”27 There is no reference in the
statute itself to the use of ALS as the guiding principle for such allocations.
As noted in the prior section, ALS was codified as the guiding standard for
reallocations in 1935.28 While regulations dictated the standard, the
technical standards for implementing ALS first developed through the
courts for the first few decades, with uneven results, and often a failure to
strictly adhere to ALS itself when evaluating challenges to revenue service
reallocations.29 Uniform technical standards for applying ALS were finally
promulgated in the regulations in 1968.30
In the present transfer pricing regime, firms are required to set internal
prices according to ALS, and the IRS is empowered to reset those prices to
properly reflect an arms-length result. Determining a particular price
requires recourse to three sets of rules. The first category of rules set forth a
variety of methods for producing an arms-length result for different kinds
of transactions.31 A second set of rules are provided to choose which of the
methods should be used in a particular case (the best method rule).32 Third,
the regulations provide a list of factors for evaluating the degree of
comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions in light of
all the facts and circumstances.33 These three aspects of the transfer pricing
rules are considered below.
The categories of intra-company transaction for which the regulations
prescribe methods include loans, money advances, the use of tangible
property, and the transfer of tangible and intangible property.34 Taking the
common case of intra-company sales of tangible property as an example, §
1.482-3(a) sets out five acceptable methods for determining whether a
transfer price adequately reflects what unaffiliated parties would have
bargained for at arms-length.35 The “comparable uncontrolled price
method” compares the price charged in the controlled transaction with the
price in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.36 The “resale price
method,” rather than comparing the total price of a comparable transaction,
compares the gross profit margin of the controlled resale transaction with

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

26 U.S.C. § 482.
See The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length, supra note 15, at 97.
See id. at 104-07.
Id. at 107.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (1995).
Id. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2009).
See generally id. § 1.482-1(c)(2).
Id. § 1.482-1(a)(1).
See id. § 1.482-3(a).
Id. § 1.482-3(b).
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the margin earned in a comparable uncontrolled resale.37 The “cost plus
method” compares the percentage markup from the cost of production in
the controlled transaction to comparable uncontrolled profit markups.38 The
“comparable profits method” is a financially complex method which
determines profit level indicators from similarly situated uncontrolled
taxpayers and compares these profit levels to that of the controlled party.39
Finally, the “profit split method” is another financially complex method
which divides profit and loss between the two controlled taxpayers based
on the profit split of similarly situated uncontrolled entities (the
“comparable profit split”), or divided in reference to the market rate of
return to each taxpayers contribution to the economic activity (the “residual
profit split”).40
There is no prescribed hierarchy or priority of methods for evaluating
a transfer price. The regulations provide only the best method rule, which
simply requires that the best method among those given for a particular
form of transaction be used.41 A method is “best” only if “the
comparability, quality of data, and reliability of assumptions under that
method make it more reliable than any other measure of the arm’s length
result.”42 The regulations give various examples of comparative analyses
between alternative methods to determine the “best” option, but the
standards in the definition are quite loose, and not surprisingly a source of
uncertainty and dispute in practice.43
The final aspect of the ALS determination is the evaluation of the
comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions.44 To
be an appropriate measure of whether a transfer price reflects arms-length
dealing, the uncontrolled transaction must be sufficiently comparable. Five
aspects of the uncontrolled transaction must be comparable to the
controlled transaction: the parties must have comparable functions (e.g.,
manufacturer and distributor), contractual terms, risks, economic
conditions, and property or services (i.e., a sale of toasters is not
comparable to a sale of computers).45
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. § 1.482-3(c).
See id. § 1.482-3(d).
See generally id. § 1.482-5.
See id. § 1.482-6; CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 748 (Charles H. Gustafson, et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1995).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c); § 1.482-8(a).
42. Id. § 1.482-8(a).
43. See RUFUS VON THULEN RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER, US INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
& TAX TREATIES § 18.03.
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1).
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It is clear even from this cursory overview of transfer pricing rules
that there are highly subjective judgments required at each stage of
determining the arms-length price for an intra-firm transaction. Regardless
of which method a taxpayer chooses as “best” for determining an armslength price, the choice will always be open to second-guessing, and “the
district director’s temptation to second-guess will be, in most cases, more
than he can resist.”46 Determining comparability of an independent
transaction requires evaluating the five factors, and the regulations
prescribe multiple standards of comparability within each of those factors.47
Compliance with this price-setting system of subjective judgments upon
subjective judgments is, not surprisingly, a source of concern and
enormous administrative expense on the part of MNEs, as compliance
requires careful documentation of intra-company transfers and the rationale
for chosen transfer prices.48 As a consequence, businesses regularly cite
transfer pricing as the most difficult and burdensome tax issue they face.49
Audit of transfer prices is a constant concern in every country where MNEs
transact business.50 The subjective nature of the pricing rules, predictably,
produces commensurate subjectivity and uncertainty in compliance.
C. The Modern Justification of ALS
Given the considerable complexity and subjective judgments required
to determine a hypothetical arms-length price for an intra-company
transfer, what are the justifications for preserving this regime? As discussed
in Part I.A, the implementation of ALS was justified at the outset only in
terms of its function as a tool for the preservation of the corporate tax base,
without any further theoretical focus on ALS per se. However, as ALS
developed into a global standard, governments and international institutions
developed a clear set of policy justifications for its continued use.
The most prominent articulation of these policy rationales, consistent
with the U.S. and other OECD member countries, is by the model rules for
transfer pricing promulgated by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators (the “Guidelines”). The
Guidelines function as model rules and all OECD member countries have
agreed to incorporate the OECD standards into their own tax
46. RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.03.
47. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d).
48. See RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.02.
49. See Rufus Rhoades, Rufus Rhoades on the Even More Curious Case of Xilinx, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4850, 4 (Aug. 9, 2010) (LEXIS).
50. Id.
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administrations.51 Accordingly, the rationale for ALS articulated in the
Guidelines can be considered the generally agreed-upon justification for the
use of ALS to set transfer prices.
In describing the role of transfer pricing in MNEs and the associated
risk of income distortion, the Guidelines set out an important assumption
about the nature of intra-firm prices. “It should not be assumed that the
conditions established in the commercial and financial relations between
associated enterprises will invariably deviate from what the open market
would demand.”52 This critical assumption made by the Guidelines—that
the related entities in a single control group related to one another in a way
economically analogous to similar unrelated enterprises—indicates that
from the standpoint of the Guidelines, ALS is used to set “real” prices.53
Even where there is no intent on the part of an MNE to minimize or avoid
taxes, an adjustment using ALS may be appropriate.54 The assumption that
arms-length prices reflect economic reality of intra-firm transactions,
though not made fully explicit in the Guidelines, is the first and most
significant justification for the ALS regime. The Guidelines suggest that
the structure of MNEs distorts natural prices, even if inadvertently, and that
ALS corrects that distortion.
The second stated justification for ALS is closely related to the first.
When ALS corrects the price distortions created by intra-firm transactions,
it provides “broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups and
independent enterprises.”55 The artificial tax advantages produced by MNE
transfer pricing would otherwise “distort the relative competitive positions”
of the two types of entities.56 Furthermore, eliminating this artificial
competitive advantage promotes the growth of international trade and
investment.57 Similar to the first justification for ALS, the necessary
implication of this stated purpose is the assumption that the difference
between related entities in an industry and individual entities performing
similar productive functions, but independently, is that the related group
has the opportunity to distort its tax bill and thereby gain an artificial
advantage over the independent entities. According to the Guidelines, the
two scenarios have the same economic reality, but with the potential for
different tax consequences, a distortion that ALS corrects.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 18.
Id. at 32.
See id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
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The third stated justification for ALS as the global transfer pricing
regime is a functional one. The Guidelines recognize that taxation of MNEs
is a global problem requiring collective action. The OECD itself represents
collective movement away from tax competition and towards
coordination.58 ALS is a broadly accepted standard, integrated into
individual states’ tax laws as well as bilateral treaties, including Article 9 of
OECD Model Tax Convention.59 Insofar as ALS is widely and uniformly
implemented, its role as a facilitator of collective action is a core
justification for its continued use. It is especially useful for avoiding double
taxation, which is the central objective of bilateral tax treaties. When one
taxing authority makes an adjustment to the income of an entity using ALS,
the fact that other tax jurisdictions where the MNE does business allocate
income using the same standard reduces the chances of conflicting
allocations that lead to double taxation. For these reasons, along with the
stated theoretical justifications, the Guidelines express a firm stay-thecourse attitude with respect to ALS.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE ARMS-LENGTH STANDARD
Using the term “failure” to describe any legal rule, much less a global
legal regime, can tend toward hyperbole. Nevertheless, to the extent that
ALS is clearly inadequate to the task it is implemented to fulfill—the
allocation of the corporate tax base of MNEs—ALS is a failed doctrine.
Central to this failure is the disconnect between the assumptions at the core
of ALS about the nature of intra-firm transactions and the economic reality
of those transactions. With the increasing pace of globalization, this
disconnect between the assumptions of ALS and the reality of global
commerce will only widen, and the use of ALS to allocate global income
on a national basis less tenable.
A. The Economic Fallacy of ALS
Recall that the OECD Guidelines offer two related theoretical
justifications for ALS: that it corrects distortions of “real” prices in intrafirm transactions, and in so doing levels the competitive playing field
between related and independent entities that otherwise perform
economically identical productive functions. The implicit assumption about
intra-firm transactions generally is that the relatedness of the transacting
parties is incidental, rather than integral to the transaction. Thus, setting the

58. See id. at 18.
59. Id. at 33.
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transfer price to the hypothetical market price supposedly puts the MNE on
equal footing with similar non-integrated actors.
The treatment of the relatedness of parties as incidental to intra-firm
transactions is the economic fallacy at the heart of ALS. Rather than
incidental, the relatedness of the members of a control group is essential to
the transactions within the group. But for the relatedness of the parties as
part of a common enterprise, they would not enter into the transactions. An
MNE, though various productive functions may be distributed among
constituent members across multiple taxing jurisdictions, is a single
integrated productive enterprise.
To treat MNEs as related only for tax distortive purposes, as ALS
impliedly does, is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of an
integrated firm. Integrated firms arise precisely in order to deviate from
arms-length prices in comparable uncontrolled transactions.60 Integrated
firms can take advantage of economies of scale, organizational efficiencies
and saved transaction costs.61 The assumption that adjusting internal prices
of MNEs can put them on equal economic footing with comparable
independent entities is therefore erroneous.
Furthermore, a corollary to considering MNEs as integrated
productive enterprises is the fact that transfer prices have no economic
substance. Recall the hypothetical U.S. producer of televisions proposed in
the Introduction. Production costs were $100 per unit with a sale price of
$150, netting a profit margin of $50 per unit from the total productive
enterprise, including manufacturing and marketing. The constituent U.S.
and Hong Kong entities worked toward a unitary profit goal, with the
transfer price charged between the entities a wholly arbitrary number, an
artifact of their distinct corporate personalities under the law with no
relation to the economic reality of the productive venture. There are of
course real economic distinctions between the two related entities, such as
employment in the respective locations, assets, and other costs distinct to
the respective entities. However, the transfer price bears no rational relation
to any real distinction, and a transfer price set to a hypothetical arms-length
price may only incidentally and partially reflect the respective contributions
of related entities to the collective productive activity. By assuming
independence between the parties that does not exist in reality, arms-length
pricing will by necessity fail to quantify synergistic gains and the value
added to each related member by the other in an integrated enterprise.62
60. See John J.A. Burke, Rethinking First Principles of Transfer Pricing Rules, 30 VA. TAX REV.
613, 627 (2011).
61. Id.
62. See id.at 626-27.
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Given that the main theoretical premises of ALS are based on an
erroneous economic assumption about the relatedness of entities in an
integrated enterprise, it is worth revisiting the rationale for continued
commitment to ALS. Why commit to a principle that a casual acquaintance
with firm economics demonstrates to be an economic fallacy? Consider
that the transfer pricing problem is produced by the mismatch between
increasing shares of income produced by integrated global entities that are
taxed on a national level. The facility to reallocate income and ALS as a
reallocation standard were a response to preserve national tax bases in
international enterprises, an increasingly difficult task. It is natural, then,
that the preference of national taxing authorities is for individual, discrete
business entities over global, transnational entities. ALS pursues this
preference by attempting to treat integrated MNEs as discrete economic
agents with a discrete tax base identifiable on a national level. This impulse
of ALS today is the same as the original, but augmented with a greater
urgency due to global commerce unconstrained by national boundaries.
B. The Administrative Failure of ALS63
In criticizing ALS, it is not enough to point out that it is premised on a
legal fiction that disregards the true economics of MNEs. While the notion
that payments which have no economic substance can somehow be made
correct is, on an economic level, nonsensical, it is necessary to interrogate
ALS solely as a corporate tax base allocation mechanism. Ultimately, ALS
is also a failure on the level of administrability, not because it is a legal
fiction as such, but because, when considering how to allocate the MNE
corporate tax base, transfer pricing does not reliably correspond to any
reasonable measure of how the tax base ought to be allocated. Furthermore,
to the extent that ALS might incidentally correspond to a reasonable
measure of allocation, it is an ambiguous and difficult to ascertain metric,
especially in comparison to easily ascertainable, real measures of economic
activity.
To judge the administrability of ALS—whether, as a general matter, it
works—means to determine its suitability for the purpose of allocating
MNE tax bases. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to first
consider what factors determine how income should be allocated among
national taxing jurisdictions. Recall the original rationale for the corporate
level income tax, as articulated by Thomas Adams. The purpose of the tax
was to cover the collective costs of maintaining the public markets, the

63. By “administrative failure” I mean to capture administration in the broadest sense of the term;
how ALS works, or does not work, in practice.
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necessary preconditions for the productive activity of business entities.64
Thus the significance of the underpayment of taxes was expressed in terms
of failure to recompense the full costs imposed and benefits derived from
the use of community assets.65 Using this burden/benefit analysis as a
starting point for judging an allocation mechanism means that the
mechanism should provide some reasonable proxy for burdens/benefits that
permit a relative allocation of the total tax in proportion to the necessary
compensation.
In addition to a connection to burdens/benefits imposed, an allocation
mechanism should have an easily ascertainable connection to the respective
taxing jurisdiction. Under the prevailing norms, the corporate tax base
consists of net income, and that tax base is allocated based on the source of
the income. Income from production of rail cars in Canada, for instance, is
Canadian-source income, and Canada is entitled to levy a tax on the net
benefit derived from that productive activity.66 However, it is precisely this
clear connection between income and territory that is undermined by the
transfer pricing problem. Thus an effective system for allocating the
income of MNEs will provide a measure of economic activity which is
clearly connected with the respective taxing jurisdictions.
Evaluating ALS in light of the foregoing, ALS begins with the
question, “What would comparable independent parties have bargained
for?” This may ultimately prevent opportunistic income-shifting that would
have resulted in undercompensation from the burden/benefit standpoint.
However, setting arms-length prices between related entities as such bears
no direct relationship to the burdens/benefits of those entities in their
respective jurisdictions. In terms of connecting activity to a particular
jurisdiction, ALS functions to directly reallocate income, so it would seem
to satisfy the clear connection requirement. However, transfer prices are a
legal fiction with no real economic substance outside of tax adjustments.
Because benefits and burdens are related to real costs, they will not align
with the deemed income allocated by ALS.
Even if ALS was suitable for allocating the tax base of MNEs as a
theoretical matter, the highly subjective nature of ascertaining arms-length
prices creates disproportionate administrative burdens, especially relative

64. See Adams, supra note 24.
65. Id.
66. Note that the U.S. income tax is residence-based, taxing residents on worldwide income
regardless of source. However, offsetting credits for foreign tax paid, e.g., from a US company doing
business in Canada, are generally available, so the net effect of this principle holds. See CHARLES H.
GUSTAFSON & RICHARD C. PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 33, 39 (4th ed.
1995).
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to other easily ascertainable, real measures of economic activity. ALS
relies on completely fictional accounting figures, which MNEs are required
to maintain for compliance purposes, rather than real measures of economic
activity that are already available through standard accounting practices
and often audited. This fictional accounting, which requires documented
justification for transfer prices, amounts to a massive burden and a cause of
considerable anxiety for MNEs.67
ALS is not a failure administratively simply because it is based upon a
legal fiction. It is a failure because it is based upon a legal fiction that
complicates and obfuscates instead of clarifying and simplifying. Compare
another legal fiction in tax law, depreciation deductions.68 The U.S.
depreciation rules provide for fictional, scheduled depreciation deductions
for enumerated asset classes.69 This necessitates a phantom accounting
system which adjusts the bases of firm assets in a manner that does not
reflect economic reality.70 The tradeoff that the depreciation rules make is
for a fictitious but highly administrable system rather than a financially
accurate but administratively difficult system (annual appraisal of all
physical assets). If you are going to create a phantom accounting system, it
should be highly standardized and predictable, with judgment calls only at
the margins. ALS, by contrast, is uncertain, subjective in every case, and
frequently subject to challenge and revision. A legal fiction that does not
gain simplicity or administrability in the bargain is an administrative
failure, especially when there are feasible alternatives that are real
measures of economic activity and readily ascertainable.
As an illustration of the multifaceted dysfunction of ALS in practice,
consider the famous transfer pricing case of Bausch & Lomb Inc. v.
Commissioner.71 Bausch & Lomb (B&L), a manufacturer of contact lenses,
developed and patented the spin cast method for manufacturing soft contact
lenses, which enabled production costs of approximately $1.50 per lens,
while alternative methods used by competitors cost at least $3.00 per lens72
B&L subsequently licensed the technology to wholly-owned Irish
subsidiary B&L Ireland.73 B&L Ireland manufactured the lenses at a cost of
approximately $1.50 per lens and then sold them to B&L for $7.50 per lens

67. See RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.02; Rhoades, supra note 49.
68. See 26 U.S.C. § 167 (2006) (amended 2007); § 168 (amended 2010).
69. See id.
70. For purposes of corporate valuation, depreciation is added back in, as it is not a real
adjustment to the value of firm assets.
71. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 550.
73. Id. at 563-64.
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(the transfer price.)74 The IRS, in challenging the transfer price as
artificially high, argued that B&L Ireland was analogous to a contract
manufacturer because sale of its total production was assured. Because it
did not bear the risks of an independent manufacturer, B&L Ireland is only
entitled to cost plus a comparable contract manufacturer markup.75 B&L
argued for application of the comparable uncontrolled price method,
presenting evidence that the $7.50 per lens price was at or below the price
which would have been charged by comparable uncontrolled manufacturers
for similar lenses.76 The court found that comparable uncontrolled price
was the appropriate method, with $7.50 a reasonable per unit price, in part
because B&L Ireland was not contractually bound to sell the lenses it
produced to B&L.77
The Bausch & Lomb case illustrates several troubling aspects of
administering ALS in practice. First, the treatment of the parent and
subsidiary as separate entities is particularly absurd in this case, as it is
clear that the transaction in question would not have occurred but for the
relatedness of the parties. Second, in the clear absence of comparable
uncontrolled transactions (given the novel manufacturing technology), the
IRS and the taxpayer submitted equally plausible arguments, in so far as
both fit the transaction into an accepted pricing method, and neither form
resembled the economic reality of the transaction. Finally, the disposition
of the case, while defensible from the standpoint of ALS, was perverse
from the standpoint of economic reality. The dramatically lower
manufacturing costs were produced in the United States through
technology development, but the return on that U.S. productive activity in
the form of higher margins was booked in Ireland. A tax avoidance
provision was used to sanction a bald tax avoidance structure because of a
hypothetical comparable market price that bore no relationship to the
economic reality of B&L’s productive activity.
Rather than a complex, ambiguous legal fiction, the economic reality
of the productive enterprise—in the form of easily ascertainable, real
economic factors—is the best proxy for allocating the tax base of MNEs in
terms of determining burden and benefit with respect to a particular taxing
jurisdiction. Depending upon arms-length transfer pricing adjustments is a

74. Id. at 583.
75. Id. at 583, 588.
76. Id. at 587.
77. Id. at 591-93. B&L was not committed to purchase the production of B&L Ireland; therefore,
it bore the risks of an independent producer, and it was entitled to the market prices commanded by
analogous independent producers. If B&L committed to purchase the entire production, it would need
to be compensated for taking on that additional risk in the form of a discounted unit price. See id.
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dysfunctional solution to a problem that is needlessly perpetuated by the
insistence on separate entity treatment and the significance of transfer
prices.
III. REFORMS AND ALTERNATIVES
Substantial reform or outright replacement of ALS seems inevitable as
the allocation of global corporate income through transfer pricing becomes
increasingly untenable and perceptions of unjust tax results from
intellectual property holding companies in tax havens and periodic
repatriation holidays reach a political boiling point. This final section will
consider potential reforms and evaluate their suitability based on whether
they utilize (i) real, easily identifiable economic factors (ii) which can be
used to approximate relative benefits and burdens on a particular tax
jurisdiction (iii) relative to the entity considered as a whole. These criteria
necessitate beginning with the MNE considered as a single entity. Reforms
and alternatives to ALS fall into two broad categories: unilateral reforms,
changes that can be implemented by individual national taxing authorities,
and multilateral reforms, changes in international law and institutions
which require collective action.
A. Multilateral Reform
Multilateral reform is the most theoretically complete mechanism for
instituting alternatives to the current ALS regime. Because the core aspect
of any reform is taking the economic reality of the MNE as an integrated
enterprise rather than the legal fiction of control group member
independence, the corporate tax base of MNEs will be defined at the first
instance on a global level. It follows that in order to comprehensively avoid
the possibility of double taxation, mutual agreement as to how that tax base
is defined is necessary. The starting point for the most complete approach
to reform, therefore, is the global consolidated tax base.
Only one credible reform proposal approaches this ideal case: the EU
Proposal for Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”). The
CCCTB, currently under consideration by the European Commission, is a
proposed single set of rules defining taxable income in the EU along with a
single consolidated tax return for the entirety of a company’s activity
within the EU.78 The tax base would effect a unitary profit and loss
calculation, but preserve the right of individual member states to set rates.79

78. European Comm’n, Common Tax Base, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu
/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
79. Id.
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Most importantly from the standpoint of reforming ALS, the CCCTB
proposal incorporates a formulary apportionment for the sharing of the
consolidated corporate tax base.80 The apportionment to individual
members of a control group is a function of sales, payroll, and assets,
equally weighted. 81 A consolidated tax base apportioned on a formulary
basis means that the CCCTB would solve the transfer pricing problem
within the EU by making intra-firm transactions irrelevant to the
calculation of income.
While the implementation of the CCCTB would solve the transfer
pricing problem within the EU, it is an incomplete solution. In a postCCCTB world, the EU would simply resemble a single national taxing
authority in the context of the global transfer pricing scheme. Absent
further reform, ALS would remain the relevant standard for setting transfer
prices between related parties in the EU and other national taxing
jurisdictions. While incomplete, the CCCTB might serve as a stepping
stone to more comprehensive reform. It is likely that a single EU tax base
would substantially reduce barriers to collective action, with agreement
between the U.S., United Kingdom, and consolidated EU likely sufficient
to initiate major changes in the larger transfer pricing regime.
B. Unilateral Reform
Notwithstanding the numerous failings of ALS, its enduring advantage
over alternative approaches is its widespread adoption, which permits
collective action on the basis of ALS and provides critical protection from
double taxation through bilateral tax treaties. As a result, any unilateral
reform will have to contend with the existing international framework that
premises MNE income allocation on making transfer pricing adjustments in
accordance with ALS. However, there is still room for unilateral action that
is compatible with the existing ALS-dominated international law
framework. This section will consider modifications to current law which
displace or augment ALS with formulary apportionment, a system which
allocates income based on the proportion of fixed economic factors in a
given jurisdiction.

80. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),
art. 86, COM (2011) 121 final (Mar. 16, 2011).
81. Id. The merits of the formula itself, a variation on the “Massachusetts Formula,” are discussed
infra Part III.B.
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1. Formulary Apportionment as an Effective Tool for Apportioning
Income Using Real Economic Factors
The mechanism traditionally contrasted with ALS when considering
how to apportion income across taxing jurisdictions is known as formulary
apportionment, since it apportions income in fixed proportion to certain
specified factors, expressed in a formula. The proposed formula for the EU
CCCTB discussed in the prior section is one example of formulary
apportionment, itself modeled on what is known as the “Massachusetts
Formula”: allocating total entity income to a particular jurisdiction in
proportion to property, payroll, and sales in that jurisdiction, giving equal
weight to each.82 The U.S. states and Canadian provinces have long used
some variation on the Massachusetts Formula to allocate the state level
corporate income tax base of domestic entities, recognizing that large
enterprises operate on a national scale such that state-by-state accounting
would be distortive of economic reality—imagine the enormous folly of
requiring transfer pricing documentation for intra-company movement of
goods and services across state lines.83 This scenario is really no different
than MNEs in the international context, except that barriers to collective
action on the state level are far lower than for the international system, and
when the respective systems were instituted, the national economy was
integrated in a way that resembles the contemporary global economy.
Replacing or augmenting ALS with some variation on the Massachusetts
Formula is the starting point for every unilateral reform proposal; no
serious reform in the academic literature is known to the author which
proposes to retain transfer pricing as the sole mechanism for allocating
MNE income.
Formulary apportionment in general has been criticized on several
grounds. First, it has been criticized as an arbitrary, if predictable division
of corporate income, in contrast to the use of transfer pricing according to
ALS, which attempts to estimate the actual division of income among
members of a related group84 However, as was demonstrated in Part II of
this paper, the notion that transfer prices at arms-length prices reflects the
“true” income of related parties is itself a fallacy. This was due in part to
the fact that the notion of the “true” location of income for MNEs in a
global economy is itself a circular concept. The income is unitary and
produced in a transnational fashion. How it is divided is precisely the
82. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business
Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 508-09
(2009).
83. See id. at 501.
84. See id. at 516.
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normative problem that should frame any analysis of reform. In contrast to
transfer pricing, a formulary apportionment approach is at least capable of
addressing the proper framing question of MNE tax base division, rather
than persisting in the erroneous assumption that related entities transact at
arms-length.
2. Proposed Applications of Formulary Apportionment
The dominant variation of formulary apportionment advocated for in
the international tax reform literature focuses on a single factor of the
traditional formula as a proposed replacement for transfer pricing: the
proportion of total sales in a jurisdiction. As the proponents of sales-based
formulary apportionment note, many states already weight the sales factor
of their apportionment formulas heavily, for two principal reasons.85 First,
destination-based sales figures are straightforward to account for and
apportion, whereas property in particular requires periodic valuation.86
Second, there has been a concern that businesses might be discouraged
from locating jobs and investment in a state which assesses taxes based on
property and employment.87 Sales are less sensitive to differences in tax
rates across jurisdictions, and the incentive to maximize sales is essentially
constant even in high-tax jurisdictions.88
Several methods for implementing formulary apportionment have
been suggested. Most straightforward, the transfer pricing rules could be
displaced directly by a formulary apportionment system.89 Under this
implementation, sales-based formulary apportionment under single-entity
tax accounting would displace the entire edifice of international tax law
built around the use of separate entity accounting and transfer pricing,
including the need for many foreign business tax credits and most of
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code.90 Another prominent proposal
would have sales-based formulary apportionment implemented as a
variation on the residual profit split method, a transfer pricing method
implemented by many OECD countries.91 Under this implementation, an
estimated market return would first be assigned to the deductible expenses
incurred in each country (the “routine income”), and any residual income

85.
(2010).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 594
Id.
Id.
Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 509.
See Morse, supra note 84, at 594.
Id. at 600-03.
See Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 500.
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would be allocated based on the relative sales in each country.92 Finally,
formulary apportionment could be applied only to a subset of intracompany transactions, such as financial transactions, which the current
transfer pricing system especially fails to account for accurately.93 Under
such an implementation, transfer pricing according to ALS would be
retained for transactions with an easily-ascertainable market price, with
formulary apportionment for financial transactions, which are otherwise
subject to widespread abuse using transfer pricing.94
3. A Flexible Approach: Tailoring Formulary Apportionment Based
on Type of Income
Given the range of proposed reforms, what should an alternative to
ALS look like? A dominant feature of current formulary apportionment
proposals is the use of outbound sales as opposed to other “supply side”
factors.95 However, if we accept that an underlying norm of allocation
should be its correspondence to measures of economic benefit/burden in
the jurisdiction, then it would be desirable to have labor and capital factors
reflected in any formulary apportionment. While outbound sales would
divide income based on the extent to which an MNE avails itself of
particular markets for its goods and services, such costs are only one aspect
of dividing the income base in a normatively desirable way. A significant
criticism of using production factors in the apportionment calculation, and
a concern of the states which weight sales more heavily, is that including
capital and labor creates “an implicit tax on the factors used in the
formula.”96 The fear is that this inclusion would in turn discourage locating
factors of production in high-tax jurisdictions. However, this rationale for
excluding productive factors from formulary apportionment is deficient for
two reasons. First, it is implicitly based on a “tax competition” normative
foundation, which as a guiding principle is not well-equipped to answer the
question of where multinational income ought to be taxed. It is a response
in part to collective action problems, but not directly to the question of
allocation on a formal level. Second, if reform of ALS is performed in
revenue-neutral fashion, U.S. corporate tax rates could be lowered

92. See id. at 509. For the existing rules on which this method is based see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6
(2011) and OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 191-203.
93. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619 (2009).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV.
593, 594 (2010); Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 498.
96. Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 509.
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considerably,97 eliminating in large part the tax-competitive concerns of
including factors of production in a formulary apportionment.
In addition to the factors themselves, the second major problem with
the implementation of a formulary apportionment reform is the inevitability
that a single multifactor formula will allocate at least some types of income
arbitrarily. Unless we use strictly destination sales, the other production
factors and the weight assigned to them represent judgments about how
income was produced and how relevant each factor is to a productive
activity in a particular taxing jurisdiction. The oil industry, for instance, has
objected to allocating income based on property and payroll, since profits
derive largely from the oil reserves themselves, an element not reflected in
the traditional formula because companies do not typically own the
reserves directly.98 Under the Massachusetts Formula, therefore, an oil
producer’s income will be allocated arbitrarily, in so far as that allocation
does not reflect the source of profits and the benefits/burdens
corresponding to its productive activity.
In light of both the desirability of including factors of production in
any formulary apportionment and the concern that any single formula will
allocate some income arbitrarily, this paper proposes a flexible approach
which uses multifactor formulas applied to particular categories of
income.99 This approach is flexible in that a national taxing authority could
establish the income categories and corresponding formulas as broadly or
narrowly as necessary to allocate income in a sufficiently non-arbitrary
fashion.
To illustrate the advantages of this flexible implementation of
formulary apportionment, consider the case of an oil company which
engages in both production and refining activity. Under a variation of the
Massachusetts formula, the company’s refining activity will be allocated in
a way that reasonably reflects both the source of income from refining and
the benefit/burden of the refining activity in the appropriate jurisdiction,
since refining is a relatively capital- and labor-intensive productive activity,
and the Massachusetts formula gives weight to those factors. However, the
company’s oil production income will be misallocated to the extent that
property and employment are excessively weighted in the Massachusetts
formula relative to the contribution of those factors to oil production
income. The company might, for instance, perform all of their drilling
activity in Canada but have the vast majority of property and payroll in the
97. See id. at 507.
98. Id. at 516.
99. Separate tax accounting treatment for different categories or baskets of income is already a
common feature in the tax code. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 901 (Foreign Tax Credit Rules).
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U.S., leading to excessive allocation of oil production income to the U.S. If
instead we apply a destination sales-based allocation, the risk of overallocation based on the location of employees and investments is
eliminated, but as a pure demand-side measure, the allocation could fail to
capture the complete benefit/burden of the company in the U.S., where it
has availed itself of labor markets and all the conditions necessary to
support capital-intensive productive activity.
A flexible formulary apportionment makes it possible to correct for
the risks of over-allocation while also accounting for the supply-side
benefit/burden through the inclusion of productive factors appropriate to
the category of income. In the case of the oil company, a flexible approach
would put the overall income of the company into two baskets: production
income and refining income. The formulary allocation of refining income
would give adequate weight to payroll and property, to reflect the
contribution of those factors in the generation of refining-related income.
The formula for oil production income would by contrast give less weight
to property and payroll, and include factors tailored to oil production. A
flexible formulary apportionment would even allow for readilyascertainable, industry specific metrics for allocation, such as
measurements of wellheads or output.
A flexible formulary apportionment approach has the potential for
considerable complexity, depending upon the degree to which the formulas
implemented by national taxing authorities are narrowly tailored to specific
income-producing activities. However, the complexity is based on
objective factors, and the difficult decision-making happens at rule
formation rather than rule application. Thus the complex, subjective
application of transfer pricing rules would be replaced with a complex, but
narrowly-tailored and objective formulary apportionment system.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that transfer pricing using ALS as a mechanism for
allocating the income of MNEs is broken and unsustainable in its
administration and for the purposes of revenue collection. Reform based on
some form of formulary apportionment is the best alternative method to
allocated MNE income based on real, readily ascertainable economic
factors. Furthermore, if we wish to return to the original, normativelycoherent basis for entity-level taxation premised upon the benefits enjoyed
and burdens imposed by the productive activities of business entities, any
reform based on formulary apportionment should consider more than
destination-based sales, as this is only one economic factor of the
benefit/burden in a particular jurisdiction. In consideration of the
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propensity for any single formula solution to allocate at least some kinds of
income arbitrarily, this paper proposes a basketing approach with different
allocation formulas based on different categories of income, in order to
tailor allocation to different forms of productive activity while maintaining
single-entity taxation according to objective economic factors.
However ostensibly fair, efficient, or politically feasible any
formulary apportionment reform proposal might appear, prospects for this
kind of comprehensive reform are uncertain. Though taxes are the price of
civilization, and corporate taxes, perhaps, are the price of secure,
functioning markets, the corporate taxpayers with the greatest pull over tax
policy are preoccupied by a culture of tax avoidance.100 In other words, it is
not clear that the cultural moment is ripe for international tax reform based
conceptually on benefits enjoyed and burdens imposed by MNEs, even if
that is the most coherent basis for the allocation of the global corporate tax
base.
Regardless of present cultural attitudes relative to taxation, there is a
growing consensus, at least academically, that ALS is hopelessly outmoded
and broken. The benign explanation for the persistence of the current ALS
regime is simple path dependence—so much is invested in this form of
international taxation that the costs of exit exceed the benefits of a more
rational, administrable system. The cynical explanation takes as its starting
point the emerging cycle of massive offshore tax deferral in anticipation of
the next repatriation holiday.101 The few large entities capable of benefiting
from ALS have far more to lose in the transition to a level, transparent
system than the rest have to gain from such reform, a political asymmetry
not easily overcome.

100. See generally Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47 (2011).
101. As an illustration of the asymmetry of political incentives, consider that those (relatively few)
firms which advocated for and then availed themselves of the 2004 repatriation holiday realized an
average return of 22,000% on their lobbying investment. See generally Raquel Alexander, Steven W.
Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Analysis
under the American Jobs Creation Act, 25 J.L. & POL. 401 (2009).

